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1. Introduction 
International mobility and vehicle imports have triggered a safety debate on the regulation of 
left-hand drive (LHD) vehicles in left-driving countries. If the vehicle configuration does not 
fit the traffic side, large blind spot areas arise that increase road accident risk, especially when 
overtaking or changing lanes (for an illustration see, Figure 1). For example, more than 10,000 
LHD heavy goods vehicles use British roads each day. These LHD trucks are highly 
overrepresented in UK accident data (Danton et al. 2009). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
A pertinent question therefore is whether the control of wrong-hand drive vehicles can enhance 
road safety. Remarkably, regulation varies substantially across countries, ranging from total 
bans to virtually no limitations. Australia, Bangladesh, Kenya, New Zealand, and Singapore, 
for example, basically banned the import of non-vintage LHD vehicles. Similarly, right-hand 
drive (RHD) vehicles are not permitted in right-hand traffic countries such as Brazil, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, and some European countries (Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia). 
Other European Union member states, however, have not imposed any regulations on RHD 
vehicles, including, Germany, France and Spain. Hungary and Romania allow RHD vehicles 
under certain conditions. In all these countries, however, wrong-hand drive vehicles are more 
or less uncommon. 
In stark contrast, wrong-hand drive vehicles have become a major issue in emerging countries, 
especially in states that were once part of the Soviet Union. Cars imported from Japan are 
usually cheaper, come with less mileage than US or European cars, and are of higher quality 
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than Russian made cars.1 Lower prices leads to a skyrocketing number of wrong-hand drive 
vehicles in countries like Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. These countries have right-hand 
traffic but experienced a drastic influx of cheap Japanese made RHD imports in recent years. 
Georgia is the most prominent case in point. The number of imported and newly registered 
RHD surged astronomically and now even exceeded the number of LHD imports. By 2015, 
around one out of four registered cars in Georgia was RHD. Similar trends apply to Kyrgyzstan 
and Russia. By December 2013, 127,383 out of 991,888 registered cars in Kyrgyzstan were 
RHD. In Russia, around 1.5 million cars were estimated to be RHD (3.6% of total vehicles); in 
some Eastern Russian regions close to Japan, RHD vehicles have a market share of up to 60%.2 
Why are wrong-hand drive vehicles cheaper than their better-fitting counterparts? One major 
reason might be that wrong-hand drive vehicles bear higher accident risks. Car prices do only 
partly internalize excessive risks because wrong-hand drive vehicles impose additional safety 
externalities on other road users. The number of traffic accidents in Kyrgyzstan with RHD cars 
involved (24 %) is reported to be as twice as high as share of registered RHD vehicles (13 %). 
In right-driving Canada, there is a similar safety discussion in many provinces over how to 
regulate imported RHD vehicles from the UK and Japan.3 Canadian car dealers admit that RHD 
vehicles “[…] aren’t designed for our roads, and thus pose a greater safety risk in this country 
than left-hand drive vehicles” (Cohen 2010). Descriptive statistics on road accidents in Canada 
underpin safety concerns. Cooper et al. (2009) show that RHD vehicles share higher accident 
rates of 30% compared to LHD vehicles. Tardif and Baril (2009) document an increase in 
accident rates of 32% for men at the age of 16 to 34 using RHD vehicles compared to LHD 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the Georgian Journal online newspaper (https://www.georgianjournal.ge/society/31555-
driving-in-georgia-doing-it-right.html). 
2 For the Russian case see Sputnik online news (https://sputniknews.com/analysis/20121003176382673/). 
3 Approximately 95,000 RHD vehicles are registered in Canada, see Kent (2011). RHD vehicles thus account for 
around 0.5% of all light road motor vehicles in Canada. 
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drivers of the same age. A causal relationship, however, has not been revealed yet. Regressing 
traffic accident figures on vehicle configuration is likely to lead to biased OLS estimates. First, 
driving a somehow more risky LHD vehicle in a left-hand traffic country might be endogenous 
to driver’s preferences and further unobservable characteristics. Second, foreignness and 
vehicle configuration are often difficult to separate. 
This study aims at identifying the causal effect of wrong-side drive vehicles on road safety 
using a natural experiment in Sweden. Swedes drove on the left side of the road for 233 years. 
For reasons of international trade and Swedish customer demand, however, “cars in Sweden 
typically had the steering wheel on the left, leading to many accidents, especially on narrow 
roads” (Hipple 2014).4 On September 3, 1967 (“Högertrafikomläggningen”), Sweden switched 
from left-hand traffic to right-hand traffic following the convention of continental Europe, and 
Swedish vehicles remain LHD. The traffic side change constitutes a drastic and unique shift in 
standards (Konrad and Thum 1993). I apply a new “backward version” of the synthetic control 
method to this setting: I match on accident figures in the period after 1967, when both Sweden 
and other European countries drove on the right and used LHD vehicles. Results show that the 
switch to right-hand traffic decreased road fatality, injury, and accident risk by approximately 
30%. An earlier switch would have saved more than 4,000 lives between 1953 and 1966. 
Imposing tough regulations on wrong-hand drive vehicles is therefore highly recommended.  
                                                 
4 The president of Volvo, Assar Gabrielsson, described Swedish vehicle demand in 1936 as follows: “Through 
this, the Swedish people has become used to have the steering wheel on the left side, in spite of Sweden having 
left-hand traffic. In most other countries, the steering wheel is located at the right side when the traffic is left-hand, 
or at the left when traffic is right-hand. We at Volvo are fully convinced that taking the road standard into 
consideration, the left shoulder is of little or no importance. It is much more important to have a clear view of the 
road ahead when overtaking. Therefore, the most logic thing would be that Volvos were made with right-hand 
drive. In spite of this, we have kept left-hand drive because we do not feel that we have to be pioneers in this area. 
We believe that we would only meet resistance from our customers and create extra work for our dealers if we 
only delivered right-hand drive Volvos. We will therefore continue to sell left-hand drive cars.” Cited after Volvo 
Owners’ Club (2007). 
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2. Identification 
I employ the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and 
Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) in a rather new fashion; OLS and WLS difference-in-differences 
estimates as proposed by DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) validate the results as I will show later 
on. The basic idea of the synthetic control method is to construct a synthetic counterfactual for 
a treated unit by matching on non-treatment period trends of the outcome variable of interest. 
The counterfactual is a simple weighted average of untreated control units from a proper donor 
pool; weights sum to one. Further (cross-sectional) matching predictors can be used to improve 
the comparability of counterfactual and treated units. 
In the basic version of the synthetic control method, the non-treatment period is followed by 
the intervention period. In the Swedish case, however, this would require a donor pool of 
countries with widespread wrong-hand drive vehicles both before and after 1967 in order to 
construct a post-1967 counterfactual to Sweden. However, there is no country worldwide where 
wrong-hand drive vehicles are conventionally used, pre-1967 Sweden being the sole exception. 
Therefore, I modified the strategy and match on post-intervention trends instead on pre-
intervention trends. After 1967, both Sweden and other European countries drove on the right 
and used LHD vehicles. The treatment of the traffic side change therefore harmonized the 
institutional framework across Sweden and the rest of Europe. Conversely, pre-1967 times 
represent the treatment period of the idiosyncratic Swedish traffic law. I propose the 
identification assumption that pre-1967 accidents in Sweden would have evolved in the fashion 
of “Synthetic Sweden” if there had been right-hand instead of left-hand driving already before 
1967. This modification of the synthetic control method is rather new and unusual. Being the 
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sole exception, Bechtel et al. (2017) use a somewhat similar approach and match on non-
treatment periods that are interrupted by treatment periods. 
I collect data on road accidents from 1953 to 2012 in 14 European countries (including 
Sweden), where virtually all vehicles used throughout the period were LHD.5 Data on road 
accidents, fatalities, injuries, road network length and the number of vehicles are obtained from 
annual publications of the United Nations. I collect information on GDP and population density 
from the Total Economy Database of The Conference Board. Data on seatbelt legislation and 
national general speed limits (dummy variables) are self-compiled. 
Sweden is the only sample country that switched from left-hand to right-hand traffic. The donor 
pool weights (𝑤𝑗) are derived in such a way that the post-1967 trend (1968 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 2012) in 
road fatalities of the treated unit Sweden (𝑦𝑡) fits road fatalities of “Synthetic Sweden” (?̂?𝑡 =
∑ ?̅?𝑗𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑗 ) best in terms of a minimized Root Mean Square Percentage Error (𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸); ?̅?𝑗𝑡 
denotes road fatalities in donor pool country 𝑗 in period 𝑡: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸 = √∑ [
(𝑦𝑡−?̂?𝑡)2
(2012−1968)
]2012𝑡=1968  (1) 
In the absence of further policy changes, pre-1967 differences between Sweden and “Synthetic 
Sweden” give the causal effect of a wrong-hand drive vehicle configuration. I discuss the issue 
of simultaneous policy interventions in more detail later on. I use additional predictors such as 
GDP per capita, population density, vehicles per road kilometer (1968–1970 average), and 
dummies for mandatory seat belt usage and general speed limits (average for entire observation 
                                                 
5 I started with a full sample of all 34 OECD countries. I dropped non-European countries (AUS, CAN, CHL, ISR, 
JAP, KOR, MEX, NZL, USA), left-hand traffic countries (GBR, IRL), and countries that do not exist for the whole 
period within their current external borders (CZE, DEU, EST, SVK, SVN). I further drop BEL, POL and GRC 
because of a serious lack of data. ISL changed from left-hand to right-hand traffic in 1968 and was also dropped. 
The remaining countries are: AUT, CHE, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, HUN, ITA, LUX, NLD, NOR, PRT and TUR. 
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period) to improve the fit of Sweden and “Synthetic Sweden”. The selection of these variables 
is based on recent studies on determinants of road accidents.6 
 [Table 1 about here] 
3. Results 
3.1 Baseline 
A synthetic control unit consisting of 80.1% Norway, 16.2% Finland, and 3.7% Netherlands 
best fits the Swedish trend in road fatalities in the right-hand traffic period after 1967. On 
average, 92 out of one million inhabitants died in the course of traffic accidents between 1968 
and 2012 in “Synthetic Sweden” which parallels to the Swedish figures of 90 road fatalities per 
million capita (see, Table 1). Figure 2 shows also a close fit of post-1967 Sweden and its 
counterfactual counterpart from a time series perspective (graphs at the right-hand side of the 
vertical line). Finally, “Synthetic Sweden” is also highly comparable to actual Sweden in terms 
of further post-intervention predictors (lower part of Table 1). Altogether, the fitting procedure 
yields a reasonable control unit to Sweden. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Contrasting the times of joint right-hand traffic after 1968, pre-1967 figures differ substantially 
(Figure 2, left-hand side of the vertical line). In this period, Sweden droves on the left side but 
“Synthetic Sweden” droves on the right side of the road – both however used LHD. Before the 
switch to right-hand traffic, Sweden exhibited substantially higher fatality rates than its 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Grimm and Treibich (2012) and Lindo et al. (2016). Weights for predictors are derived according to 
their predictive power on the outcome as proposed by Abadie et al. (2015). I do not match over pre-1967 predictors, 
because figures might be endogenous to treatment-induced road safety outcomes. 
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synthetic counterpart. On average, Swedish fatality rates outweighed synthetic fatality rates by 
41 fatalities per million capita before 1967 (see, Table 1). Thus, driving a wrong-hand side 
vehicle leads to an increase in road fatality risk of roughly 30% corroborating prior descriptive 
results by Cooper et al. (2009) and Tardif and Baril (2009). Given Sweden’s population of 7.5 
million inhabitants in the 1960s, an earlier switch would have saved more than 4,000 lives 
between 1953 and 1966. 
3.2 Robustness 
I conduct several robustness tests that underpin baseline results. First, I substitute road fatalities 
with road accidents and road injuries in order to account for the number and severity of 
accidents. I have to restrict the dataset to the years 1955 to 2002 because of missing data in 
several countries. On average, the number of road accidents was lower by 35% in “Synthetic 
Sweden” than in actual Sweden before 1967 (Figure 3, left-hand side, and Table 1). Road 
injuries would have been lower by 32% under right-hand traffic. These results strongly 
corroborate the findings for road fatalities (29%). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Second, I test pseudo treatments. The synthetic control group method should not yield any effect 
in the absence of a treatment. First, I test Sweden’s neighbor Denmark where there was always 
right-hand traffic. Both Denmark and Sweden simultaneously experimented with speed limits 
in the 1960s and Denmark implemented a general speed limit only few years after Sweden 
(Evans 1985). Both Scandinavian countries were similar in culture and policies are therefore 
somewhat comparable in terms of mid-1960s traffic regulation – the unique change of the traffic 
side in Sweden being the main exception. Since Denmark did not experience a shock in fashion 
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of the Swedish case, one would not expect any treatment effect. To test this empirically, I apply 
a (placebo) treatment to Denmark. The left-hand graph of Figure 4 shows the results. As 
expected, “Synthetic Denmark” neither differs from actual Denmark before 1967 nor after 
1967. Denmark is not a cherry picked case. I apply the pseudo treatment procedure to all 
countries in the dataset and compute RMSPE ratios. RMSPE ratios measure to which extent the 
non-treatment period fit differs from the treatment period fit of the synthetic unit and the treated 
observation (see, e.g., Abadie et al. 2015). Large ratios indicate substantial differences in fits. 
The right-hand right graph of Figure 4 shows that the ratio for Sweden is an exceptional outlier 
among all other sample countries including the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway and 
Finland. Thus, Sweden is the sole European sample country that experienced an idiosyncratic 
shock at around 1967. 
Third, I test whether results are robust to alternative estimation techniques. I perform two 
different difference-in-differences estimations with year and country fixed effects to validate 
synthetic control results and to avoid any concerns regarding the comparably large synthetic 
control weight of Norway. In a first set of difference-in-differences estimations, I rely on OLS 
and the full sample of 14 countries. Sweden is the treated unit, the 13 other countries are equally 
weighted. By definition, this procedure reduces the weight of Norway drastically below its 
synthetic control method weight of around 80 % and allows to assess the sensitivity of the 
counterfactual composition. As a downside, however, this procedure, may result in a violated 
common trend assumption. Therefore, I conduct a second set of estimations combining 
difference-in-differences with the synthetic control group as proposed by DeAngelo and 
Hansen (2014). The basic idea is to use donor pool weights derived by the synthetic control 
group as observation weights in a WLS difference-in-differences regression. This allows to 
derive difference-in-differences inferences for a counterfactual with an even closer fit in post-
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1967 outcomes than in unweighted OLS regressions. OLS and WLS difference-in-differences 
estimations therefore differ in the usage of regression weights; both sets of estimations are 
specified as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑆𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒1967𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡′𝛾 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
with 𝑖 = 1, … ,14; 𝑡 = 1, … ,59 
with 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denoting the outcome variable road fatalities, road accidents, or road injuries per one 
million capita. 𝛽 is the coefficient of interest measuring the pre-1967 effect of Swedish left-
hand traffic; 𝑆𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for Sweden and zero otherwise, 
𝑃𝑟𝑒1967𝑡 equals one for the period before 1967 and zero otherwise. The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 refers to 
control variables (seatbelt usage, speed limit legislation). 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 represent country and year 
fixed effects, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. I estimate the models with standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity (Huber-White sandwich standard errors, see Huber 1967 and White 1980).7 
Table 2 compares the results of the synthetic control method (columns (1) to (3)) to OLS and 
WLS difference-in-differences estimations. Column (4) shows that the OLS difference-in-
differences coefficient for pre-treatment Sweden amounts to 56.7 road fatalities per million 
capita which is larger than the synthetic control method findings (40.6 road fatalities per million 
capita, column (1)). By contrast, if using synthetic control weights in a WLS estimation, post-
1967 effects (31.5 fatalities per million capita) are smaller compared to synthetic control group 
results. Both OLS and WLS estimates are at least significant at the 5% level. By contrast, 
neither seatbelt nor speed limit legislation predict road fatalities. Difference-in-differences 
                                                 
7 Inferences do not change when standard errors are clustered at the country level. I stick to robust standard errors 
because the maximum number of clusters is however fairly low. 
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estimates for road accidents and road injuries per million capita do also corroborate synthetic 
control findings (compare columns (2), (5) and (8) in Table 2 for road accidents, and columns 
(3), (6) and (9) for injuries). Difference-in-differences estimates fairly reproduce the synthetic 
control group findings for road accidents whereas difference-in-differences for road injuries are 
somewhat smaller than the related synthetic control findings. All OLS and WLS difference-in-
differences coefficients, however, turn out to be statistically different from zero. In conclusion, 
I can exclude that the composition of the counterfactual, i.e., the comparably large synthetic 
control weight of Norway, drives the results. 
4. Excluding other channels 
The main assumption of the synthetic control method is the absence of simultaneous policy 
changes other than the treatment of interest. In the following section, I show that neither speed 
limit legislation, public transport, nor accidents caused by tourists drive the results. 
4.1 Speed limit legislation 
Around 1967/1968, Sweden did not only change to right-hand traffic but also extended its 
highway summer speed limit to an all-season general speed limit (Evans 1985). Speed limit 
legislation thus overlap with the traffic side change to some extent which may seriously 
challenge the results. I use speed limit legislation in the synthetic control method as predictor 
which should reduce biases to some extent. However, I present four further reasons why 
decreases in road accidents are likely to be caused by the traffic side switch and not by speed 
limits. 
First, if all-season speed limit legislation would have been effective, we would expect that the 
relative share of winter accidents decrease and the share of summer accidents increase – 
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compared to summer speed limit times. To test this consideration, I collect data on the monthly 
distribution of road fatalities in Sweden just before and after the traffic side switch. Figure 5 
shows that the monthly distribution of road fatalities hardly changed after the speed limits were 
rolled over to the entire year. The share of road fatalities in June and July somewhat increase 
under the all-season speed limits but the share for August and September decreased. This 
finding does not suggest that speed limit legislation drive accidents. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Second, speed limits before 1967 mainly applied to highways and therefore non-built-up 
locations. If speed limits were effective, the distribution of accidents across built-up and non-
built-up areas should have changed after general speed limits replaced the location specific 
speed limits in 1967. Figure 6 however show that there was no shift in the location of road 
accidents in Sweden after 1967. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
Third, the change of the traffic side mainly affected drivers of cars whose field of view was 
considerably bad before 1967. Motorcycles, by contrast, have a single and fixed position of the 
driver and were therefore arguably less affected by left-hand traffic (only indirectly by riskily 
overtaking cars). Both types of vehicles however are subject to speed limits. If speed limits 
have caused the decrease in accidents, one should observe comparable effects for both types of 
vehicles. I collect data on road causalities (injuries and fatalities) by the type of the vehicle 
involved (car, motorcycle) for Sweden and for its main synthetic counterpart country, Norway. 
I compute the difference between both types of vehicles in the annual growth rates of road 
causalities per million capita. Figure 7 show the results of this procedure for the period before 
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1967 and after 1967 comparing Sweden to Norway. Bars larger than zero show that car related 
road causalities per capita increase faster than road causalities by motorcycles for all years. 
After 1967, this differential was at 0.8 to 0.9 percentage points in Sweden and in Norway. In 
Norway, we observe a comparable differential also before 1967 (0.9 %). In pre-1967 Sweden, 
by contrast, road causalities of car passengers grew around 10 % faster than road causalities of 
motorcycles. Thus, Swedish cars were exposed to a drastically higher increase in causality risk 
before 1967 compared to motorcycles. This finding of an asymmetrical effect of the pre-1967 
period on cars and motorcycles gives further support to the hypothesis that results are driven 
by the change of the traffic side rather than by speed limits. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
Fourth, and finally, difference-in-differences estimates indicate that speed limit legislation does 
not predict fatality figures in the dataset of 14 European countries. Table 2 shows that dummies 
for speed limit legislation are not significantly correlated with road fatalities and road accidents 
per capita. I find a significantly negative effect of speed limits on road injuries which however 
do not change the effect of the traffic side switch (compare columns (6) and (9) to column (3) 
in Table 2. This finding is in line with the traffic safety literature which generally acknowledges 
at least some accident severity reducing effects of speed limits (e.g., Elvik 2005, Vadeby and 
Forsman 2017). Evidence for Scandinavian countries in the mid-1960s however is mixed 
because effects mainly depend on driver’s compliance with speed limits; speed limits do not 
necessarily translate in a reduction of actual speed (see Færdselssikkerhedskommissionen 1966, 
Haight 1977, Nilsson 1982; see also Heydari et al. 2014). Moreover, recent evidence from 
Denmark shows that raising speed limits can even lower accident rates because risky overtaking 
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decreases (Road Safety GB 2014). Against this background, effects of the Swedish general 
speed limit legislation are far from clear and might be less important than the traffic side switch. 
Altogether, I do not find evidence that the change from temporal and spatial speed limits to a 
general speed limit changed the distribution of road accidents across time and space. Moreover, 
1967 legislation seem to have asymmetrical effects on road causalities involving cars and 
motorcycles. I do also find evidence that speed limit legislation predict fatality figures in the 
dataset of 14 European countries. Altogether, I conclude that speed limit legislation should not 
drive the results.8 
4.2 Other safety regulations 
Further safety regulations were introduced in Sweden and in the main donor pool country, 
Norway, at about the same time. For example, in both countries, seat belt usage became 
mandatory in 1975 (see Lindgren and Stuart 1980, Assum 2003). Other important measures, 
such as alcohol legislation and vehicle inspections, do not predict road accidents in Sweden and 
Norway (Lindgren and Stuart 1980, Fosser 1992).9 Finally, safety requirements, e.g., for tires, 
sun visors, or windshields, were not introduced in Sweden until 1971, and they mainly affected 
vehicles of model year 1969 and later only.10 In conclusion, widespread wrong-hand drive 
vehicles remain the main difference between pre-1967 Sweden and “Synthetic Sweden”. 
                                                 
8 This corroborates ambiguous findings of prior studies on the effect of speed limits on road fatalities. See, for 
example, McCarthy (1993). See also recent results from an experiment in Denmark: Road Safety GB (2014). 
9 Findings for the US and the UK are contradictory as well. See Cotti and Walker (2010), Lovenheim and Slemrod 
(2010), Green et al. (2014). 
10 On the effects of post-1971 road safety measures in Sweden, see Elvik et al. (2009). 
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4.3 Public transport 
I can also exclude that public transport challenges the results. If bus doors open on the “wrong 
side”, passengers will be exposed to substantially higher accident risks. In contrast to the 
common LHD passenger cars, however, busses in Sweden were usually RHD before 1967. 
After 1967, Sweden quickly replaced approximately 8,000 RHD busses with LHD busses. 
Public transport thus always fit the traffic side, so it should not drive accident figures. 
4.4 Tourism 
Finally, tourists and commuters from right-driving Europe might be an issue. However, 
accidents involving foreigners only accounted for 2% of total accidents 1966.11 Thus, the results 
are not biased by tourists. 
5. Conclusion 
I show that adjusting the traffic side to the common LHD vehicle configuration decreased road 
fatality, injury and accident risk in Sweden by approximately 30% which is substantial. 
Translating this finding to UK figures, around 370 accidents involving 520 casualties would 
have been avoided in 2015 if LHD were banned from British roads; accidents with heavy goods 
vehicles could be reduced by 2.3% from approximately 6,040 to 5,900.12 In Kyrgyzstan, around 
70 out of the 920 annual road fatalities and 675 out of 9,370 road injuries in 2014 could be 
                                                 
11 Arkansas Highway Magazine (September 1967) reports that 2,000 foreigners were involved in road accidents in 
Sweden in 1966. Given the average number of 1.4 persons per (fatal or injury) accident, foreigners account for 
2.2% of the 63,451 total accidents. Figures: Annual Yearbook of Sweden (1968). 
12 According to the UK Government Department for Transport, LHD vehicles account for 1,240 of 140,056 
accidents and 1,745 of 186,189 causalities in 2015. I assume that accidents caused by LHD decrease by 30%. 
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avoided by banning RHD vehicles.13 Against the background of a comparable share of RHD 
vehicles and traffic injury figures, similar figures apply to Georgia. 
From an isolated road safety perspective, the results clearly imply that tough regulations on the 
import of wrong-hand drive vehicles should be legislated. However, it is unclear whether the 
costs of bans outweigh the benefits. This might even more true for emerging former Soviet 
countries where wrong-hand drive vehicles have become increasingly popular in recent years. 
Newspapers reported that thousands of RHD drivers and car dealers protested in Tbilisi against 
the Georgian government’s plan to ban RHD imports in late 2015; similar protests occurred in 
Kyrgyzstan.14 Russia introduced tariffs of 100% to 200% on RHD vehicles from Japan in 2008 
which leads to massive riots in Siberia. “Protests swept Vladivostok, with people on the streets 
swiftly moving from economic demands to anti-governmental slogans. Thousands of motorists 
blocked highways and even tried (unsuccessfully) to storm a local airport.”15 Political leaders 
reacted to protest and intervene harshly (Russia) or postponed planned import bans of wrong-
hand drive vehicles (Georgia and Kyrgyzstan). For countries such as Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, 
changing the traffic side as in the case of Sweden may become a reasonable solution in future 
years if the rapid trends toward RHD vehicles continue. As an alternative, politicians should 
consider to impose mandatory Fresnel window lenses which may help improve driver’s field 
of vision, but are less incisive than car bans. 
                                                 
13 Figures on accidents taken from KabarNews online newspaper (see http://old.kabar.kg/eng/society/full/13263 
and http://old.kabar.kg/eng/society/full/11738). Again, I assume that accidents caused by wrong-hand drive 
vehicles decrease by 30%. 
14 See Georgia Today, 8.–10.12.2015, p. 2 and footnote 2. 
15 Sputnik online news (https://sputniknews.com/analysis/20121003176382673/). 
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FIGURE 1. FIELD OF VIEW UNDER DIFFERENT VEHICLE CONFIGURATIONS 
LHD 
 
 RHD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the field of view for the driver of an LHD and RHD vehicle under right-hand traffic. The 
mirrored configuration applies to left-side traffic. 
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FIGURE 2. ROAD FATALITIES IN SWEDEN 
 
Notes: The figure depicts road fatalities per million capita in Sweden and its synthetic counterpart. “Synthetic 
Sweden” consists of 80.1% Norway, 16.2% Finland, and 3.7% Netherlands. The vertical solid line represents the 
year 1967, when Sweden switched to right-hand traffic. 
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FIGURE 3. ROAD ACCIDENTS AND INJURIES 
  
Notes: The figure depicts road accidents and injuries per million capita in Sweden and its synthetic counterpart. 
The vertical solid lines represent the year 1967, when Sweden switched to right-hand traffic. Left-hand side 
(accidents): “Synthetic Sweden” consists of 85.2% Norway, 4.7% Denmark, and 10.0% Turkey. Right-hand side 
(injuries): “Synthetic Sweden” consists of 68.5% Norway, 28.6% Finland, 1.7% Netherlands, and 1.2% Turkey. 
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FIGURE 4. PSEUDO TREATMENTS 
  
Notes: Left-hand side: The figure depicts road fatalities per million capita in Denmark and its synthetic counterpart. 
The vertical solid line represent the year 1967, when Sweden switched to right-hand traffic. “Synthetic Denmark” 
consists of 50.1% Finland, 28.4% Switzerland, 19.8% Netherlands, 1.6% Luxemburg, and 0.1% Norway. Right-
hand side: Ratio of non-treatment period and treatment period RMSPE. 
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FIGURE 5. MONTHLY SHARES OF ROAD FATALITIES IN SWEDEN 
 
Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of Swedish road fatalities among months. Black bars represent the 
average monthly share of total Swedish road fatalities between 1963 and 1966 (summer-time speed limit), and 
white bars represent the average between 1968 and 1971 (all-season speed limit). 
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FIGURE 6. LOCATION OF ROAD ACCIDENTS IN SWEDEN 
 
Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of Swedish road fatalities among locations. Black bars represent the 
share of total Swedish road accidents by location between 1963 and 1966 (no formal speed limits), and white bars 
represent the average between 1968 and 1971 (fade-in of speed limits, especially in non-built-up areas). 
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FIGURE 7. GROWTH RATE DIFFERENTIAL IN ROAD CASUALITIES CARS–MOTORCYCLES 
 
Notes: The figure depicts the difference in growth rates of road causalities (injuries, fatalities) per million capita 
of car passengers vs motorcycle passengers 1967 (left-hand side) and afterwards (right-hand side). Black bars 
represent Sweden, white bars represent Norway. For example, in pre-1967 Sweden, road causalities by car 
accidents increase 9.9% faster than causalities caused by motorcycles. 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Sweden 
“Synthetic  
Sweden” 
Full sample  
(without Sweden) 
Ratio “Synthetic  
Sweden”–Sweden 
Period 
Before 1967      
Road fatalities 142 101 147 71% 1953–1966 
Road accidents 2,274 1,482 3,503 65% 1953–1966 
Road injuries 2,785 1,884 2,904 68% 1953–1966 
After 1967      
Road fatalities 90 92 144 102% 1968–2012 
Road accidents 1,911 1,949 3,811 102% 1968–2002 
Road injuries 2,526 2,574 3,173 102% 1968–2002 
Predictors      
GDP (Euro per capita) 22,909 22,751 19,282 99% 1968–1970 
Population per km² 17.7 23.1 107.2 130% 1968–1970 
Vehicles per km road 15.6 17.6 28.1 112% 1968–1970 
Seatbelt legislation 0.6 0.6 0.6 100% 1953–2012 
Speed limit 0.9 0.9 0.7 105% 1953–2012 
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of outcome variables (upper panel) and predictors (lower panel). Road 
fatalities, accidents and injuries per million capita; 1967 excluded. 
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TABLE 2. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES 
 
Synthetic control group 
Difference-in-differences 
Difference-in-differences using 
synthetic control group weights 
OLS WLS 
Road 
fatalities 
Road 
accidents 
Road 
injuries 
Road 
fatalities 
Road 
accidents 
Road 
injuries 
Road 
fatalities 
Road 
accidents 
Road 
injuries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(Sweden × Pre-1967) 40.60 791.74 901.45 56.71*** 836.48** 797.59** 31.51** 640.03* 748.45*** 
 – – – (14.18) (319.81) (324.70) (7.59) (255.66) (128.04) 
Seatbelt legislation    16.10 875.44 472.31* -3.40 158.87 89.50 
    (12.22) (562.97) (247.22) (2.32) (156.95) (402.25) 
Speed limit    -19.51 -479.96 -847.60* -34.11 -612.53 -863.15** 
    (19.94) (553.50) (417.23) (15.12) (464.36) (209.00) 
Year fixed effects – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 826 686 517 826 686 517 236 188 245 
Countries 14 14 11 14 14 11 4 4 5 
Within R² – – – 0.59 0.25 0.23 0.95 0.67 0.75 
Notes: The table reports the effects of the switch to right-hand traffic in Sweden in 1967 on road fatalities, road 
accidents, and road injuries per million capita as dependent variable. The interaction term (Sweden × Pre-1967) 
equals one for Sweden in the period of left-hand traffic before 1967. Columns (1) to (3) report synthetic control 
group results (difference between actual and synthetic observation in pre-1967 period), columns (4) to (6) report 
(unweighted) OLS differences-in-differences estimates, and columns (7) to (9) report differences-in-differences 
estimates using the synthetic control weights (for weights see notes of Figure 2 and Figure 3) in WLS estimations. 
Significance levels (Robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
